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III. THE PEOPLE
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF
RACE AND CRIME
PAUL BUTLER∗
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article considers the evolution of thinking about criminal justice
and racial justice over the last one hundred years.
If I were writing about race and crime in 1910, the year the Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology was founded, 1 the problem that I would
have focused on would be lynchings, which were sometimes an extra-legal
response to African-American criminal suspects (and sometimes just
random mob violence). The National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) was created the year before the Journal. 2 The
NAACP began as a response to the domestic terrorism of rampant
lynchings, which were mainly in the South but all over the country. 3 Most
of the victims were African-American but there were Latino, Jewish, and
immigrant victims as well. 4 Thus the main race and crime problem, as

∗
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Development, George Washington University Law School. I thank the other participants in
the symposium for helpful comments. Aaron J. Sussman provided exemplary research
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1
Jennifer Devroye, The Rise and Fall of the Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 7 (2010). The Institute established the Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology the following year. Id. at 8.
2
GILBERT JONAS, FREEDOM’S SWORD: THE NAACP AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST RACISM
IN AMERICA, 1909-1969 11 (2005).
3
Id. at 111 (“During its first two decades . . . the NAACP’s solitary political focus . . .
was the campaign to outlaw lynching nationally.”).
4
W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 18801930, 91, 100 (1993).
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identified by the first significant civil rights organization, was black
victimization by white criminals.
Other race and crime problems I would have focused on in 1910
include de jure discrimination against African Americans, including their
exclusion from juries. 5 I would have been concerned about wrongful
convictions, especially in death penalty cases when there was a black
suspect and a white victim. 6 I probably would have mentioned the related
concern of lack of effective assistance of counsel. 7 I would have
complained about the way that the police enforced vagrancy laws. 8 If
punishment came up outside of the death penalty context, there might be
some discussion of chain-gangs or conditions in segregated “colored only”
prisons. 9 I would have been concerned about quasi-scientific responses to

5
As a result of the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), de jure
segregation was still considered constitutionally valid. Even de jure racial segregation in
housing had been upheld by state courts until invalidated in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60 (1917). Of course, the doctrine of “separate but equal” was not struck down completely
until Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY 39-43 (2004) (explaining that, despite the holding in Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1880), which prohibited de jure exclusion of African-American jurors,
subsequent decisions that rejected challenges to disenfranchisement allowed jurisdictions to
exclude African-American jurors by selecting jurors through voter lists, since few blacks
were registered to vote).
6
See, e.g., EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT; SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL
ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 22-27 (1932) (detailing the story of Payne Boyd, an AfricanAmerican man who, as a result of mistaken identity, was wrongly arrested and convicted for
a white man’s murder, even though thirty-one witnesses testified that the defendant was not
Cleveland Boyd, the black man whom both parties admitted did commit the crime); see also
STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 137-43 (2002) (explaining
that in some southern states, the death penalty could be used to punish some crimes such as
arson, murder, and robbery, but only if the defendant was black, and, in the case of rape and
kidnapping, only if the victim was white).
7
The Sixth Amendment, which today guarantees indigent defendants the right to
effective counsel, had not yet been incorporated; thus, not only was effective assistance of
counsel not constitutionally guaranteed, but, in state prosecutions, indigent defendants
practically had no right to counsel whatsoever. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62
(1942).
8
See also William O. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1, 13
(1960). See generally Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era:
Exploitative or Competitive?, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1984).
9
See DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL
OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 57-62 (1996) (describing the use of incarcerated African Americans as
cheap labor); Nancy A. Ozimek, Note, Reinstitution of the Chain Gang: A Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 6 B.U. PUB. INT‘L L.J. 753, 758-63 (1997) (describing the history of
chain gangs and their disproportionate impact on African Americans).
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criminality like eugenics and forced sterilization,10 and worried about their
application to African Americans. 11
A few years down the road from 1910, as formal police departments
spread about the country, I certainly would have written about the problem
of police brutality, and the widespread antipathy that blacks and police—
two very distinct groups—had for each other. 12
If I had spoken to a conference of progressives, say the members of the
NAACP, which from its inception included many whites,13 I would also
have mentioned the need for more black police officers. The suggestion
that there needed to be more African-American prosecutors and judges
would have been seen as so pie-in-the-sky as to be almost silly. In 1910 my
great-grandfather cleaned outhouses for a living and, about twenty years
later, my grandfather had one of the best jobs a black man could have—he
was a Pullman porter.
That was then, this is now. I am a law professor. The President of the
United States is an African-American man. And there are almost one
million African-American people in prison. 14 The major race and crime
problems of our time are the mass incarceration of African Americans and
the extraordinary disparities between blacks and whites in the criminal
justice system.
The fundamental paradox is that, in 2010, while evidence of racial
progress is everywhere, racial disparities in criminal justice have never been
greater. Nearly one in three young black men has a criminal case: he’s
either locked up, on probation or parole, or awaiting trial.15 If we look at
black-white racial disparities in education, 16 housing, 17 health care, 18

10
See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding forced sterilization of Carrie
Buck, an alleged “feeble minded” woman).
11
EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 165-69
(1995) (describing popularity of eugenics movements in the Deep South).
12
MARILYNN S. JOHNSON, STREET JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF POLICE VIOLENCE IN NEW
YORK CITY 57-86 (2003) (describing race riots and police brutality in New York City’s
increasingly black “Tenderloin” district).
13
JONAS, supra note 2, at 11.
14
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR
2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 19 tbl.16 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf.
15
MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM:
FIVE
YEARS
LATER
1-5
(1995),
available
at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_youngblack_5yrslater.pdf.
16
In 2007, the dropout rate for white students was 6.1%; for African Americans, it was
11.5%. NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION 2009 182 tbl.A-20-1 (2009), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/
pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2009081.
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employment, 19 the ratio is usually 2:1 or 3:1. So, for example, the black
unemployment rate is often twice the white unemployment rate.20 Those
disparities have either remained constant over the last one hundred years, or
have gotten better. 21 Right now the black-white incarceration disparity is
7:1. 22 Over the last several decades, as African Americans presumably
have had more and more opportunities, have been freed of de jure
discrimination, and as overt racial prejudice has become socially
stigmatized, the black-white disparity in incarceration has risen.23 How can
this be explained?

17
Though African Americans constitute less than one-sixth of the total population, they
make up one half of the homeless population. See Daniel White & Charles Crawford,
African American Males and Homelessness: Voices from the Shelter, in 1 HOMELESSNESS IN
AMERICA 189-92 (Robert Hartmann McNamara ed., 2008).
18
African Americans are more than twice as likely as white Americans to die of
diabetes, and in their first year of life, 108.14% more African-American infants die than do
white infants. See Vernellia R. Randall, Racist Health Care: Reforming an Unjust Health
Care System to Meet the Needs of African-Americans, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 127, 140-43
(1993).
19
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND
ETHNICITY, 2008 3-5 (2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsrace2008.pdf.
20
In 2008, the unemployment rate for African Americans was 10.1%.
The
unemployment rate for whites was 5.2%. Id. at 5 tbl.1.
21
See, e.g., NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 16, at 183 tbl.A-20-2
(showing that the dropout rate for black students has dropped from 19.1% in 1980 to 8.4%
in 2007).
22
In 2008, about 846,000 of the approximately 38 million African Americans were in
jail or prison. In contrast, about 712,500 of the approximately 228 million white Americans
were similarly incarcerated. That’s one in forty-five blacks, and about one in three hundred
and twenty whites. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2008—
STATISTICAL TABLES 17 tbl.16 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/pim08st.pdf; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2008 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 1-YEAR
ESTIMATES, available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=
01000US&-qr_name=ACS_2008_1YR_G00_DP5.
23
In 1950, the incarceration rate (number incarcerated per every 100,000 persons) was
86 for whites and 406 for blacks; blacks were almost five times more likely to be locked up
than whites. See MARGARET WERNER CAHALAN, HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS STATISTICS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1850-1984 65 tbl.3-31 (1986); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1951 8 (1951), available at http://www2.census.gov/
prod2/statcomp/documents/1951-02.pdf. However, in 2008, the incarceration rate was 360
for whites and 2,461 for blacks; blacks are now almost seven times more likely to be locked
up than whites; see HEATHER C. WEST, & WILLIAM J. SABOL, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR
2008 - STATISTICAL TABLES, 17 (2009); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2008 AMERICAN COMMUNITY
SURVEY, tbl.B02001, available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DTTable?_bm=y&geo_id=01000US&-ds_name=ACS_2008_3YR_G00_&-mt_name=ACS_2008_3YR_G2000
_B02001. Therefore, since 1950, the incarceration rate for whites has quadrupled, but the
rate for blacks has more than sextupled.
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II. THE NEW JIM CROW
There are two competing narratives about race and criminal justice
over the last one hundred years (or, more accurately, the last one hundred
and fifty years, since the end of slavery). One narrative is that mass
incarceration is the “New Jim Crow.” 24 Under this analysis, slavery, de jure
segregation, and now mass incarceration serve many of the same functions
and have many of the same effects. 25 There are more blacks in the criminal
justice system now (incarcerated, on probation or parole, awaiting trial)
than were slaves in 1850. 26 In 2006, one in nine young black men were in
prison, and black men were eight times more likely to be in jail or prison
than white men. 27 More black men are barred from voting than when the
Fifteenth Amendment was ratified.28
Michelle Alexander’s book, The New Jim Crow, advances the theory
that, in today’s “colorblind[]” era, police, prosecutors, judges, and
legislators use criminal history as a proxy for race, thereby establishing (or
maintaining) a racial caste system. 29 During the Jim Crow era, blacks were
discriminated against, disenfranchised, excluded from juries, prevented
from bringing legal challenges, and denied other civil, political, and legal
rights. 30 The same can be said today about felons, a disproportionate
number of whom are African-American. 31 Alexander asserts that in the era
of mass incarceration, a newly freed felon has “scarcely more rights, and
arguably less respect, than a freed slave or a black person living ‘free’ in
Mississippi at the height of Jim Crow.” 32
According to Alexander, the war on drugs is the primary tool in
creating today’s caste system. Since the war on drugs began approximately
thirty years ago, the U.S. penal population has almost sextupled, growing
from around 300,000 to two million; more than half of these incarcerations

24

See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
25
Id. at 185-95; see also DEAD PREZ, Behind Enemy Lines, on LET’S GET FREE (Loud
Records 2000) (“Behind enemy lines, my niggas is cellmates. / Most of the youth never
escape the jail fate. / Super maximum camps will advance their game plan / to keep us in the
hands of the man. Locked up.”).
26
ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 271 n.7 (citing PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31:
THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS (2009); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE SEVENTH
CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1850 ix tbl.1 (1853)).
27
ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 98.
28
Id. at 175.
29
Id. at 2.
30
Id. at 185-95.
31
Id. at 97, 185-95.
32
Id. at 138.
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were drug convictions. 33 Today, about half of a million people are in jail or
prison for a drug offense; this is more than a ten-fold increase from 1980. 34
As a result, the United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world
by far; we incarcerate 750 adults per 100,000, while Germany, for example,
incarcerates 93 per 100,000. 35 The incarceration rate has skyrocketed
despite the fact that the rate of violent crimes is historically low. 36
The discriminatory results of the drug war are clear. Three-fourths of
those imprisoned for drug offenses are black or Latino. 37 In seven states,
80% to 90% of imprisoned drug offenders are black. 38 Such disparities
cannot be explained by disproportionate use of drugs by African
Americans; blacks don’t use drugs more than any other group, and some
studies have even found that they use them less.39
Instead of a formally discriminatory legal regime under Jim Crow, the
caste system of mass incarceration relies on the unchecked discretion of
police officers and prosecutors. Though all races use illegal drugs at similar
rates, law enforcement officers target inner-city minorities; one study in
Seattle showed that officers more frequently surveilled open-air drug
markets even though most citizen complaints regarded suspected drug use
in residences, that officers targeted a downtown drug market even though
the frequency of transactions was higher in an outdoor drug market in a
white neighborhood, that officers arrested black dealers far more often than
white dealers even though white dealers were plainly visible, and that
officers overwhelmingly focused on crack cocaine, preferred by the
African-American community, even though more overdose deaths were the
result of heroin use. 40 The Supreme Court has contributed to this highly
differential system. Between 1982 and 1991, 90% of Supreme Court
decisions regarding the Fourth Amendment as applied to narcotics were
reversals in favor of the government. 41 Frustrated, Justice Thurgood

33

Id. at 6.
Id. at 59.
35
Id. at 6.
36
Id. at 99.
37
Id. at 96-97.
38
Id. at 96.
39
Id. at 97 (citing NATI’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
MONITORING THE FUTURE: 1 NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS ON DRUG USE, 1975-1999:
SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENTS (2000)).
40
Id. at 120-22, 124-25.
41
Id. at 61 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 600 (1991) (Stevens, J.
dissenting)).
34
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Marshall had to remind his colleagues that there is “no drug exception” to
the Bill of Rights. 42
Similar statistics reveal racial disparities in police officers use of
traffic stops; on the New Jersey Turnpike, where 15% of drivers are black,
42% of stops, and 73% of arrests were of black motorists, even though
whites were more likely to be found carrying illegal drugs in their
vehicles. 43
Even though America’s laws must be formally colorblind, the
Supreme Court has approved the practice of using race as a factor to
determine whether an individual is sufficiently suspicious to investigate, at
least in the context of immigration. 44 Moreover, the Court has made it
difficult to challenge discrimination other than in its extreme forms. For
example, the Court refused to grant relief to a death row inmate convicted
in Georgia, where prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of cases
involving blacks accused of killing whites but only 19% of cases involving
whites accused of killing blacks. 45 The Court held that an undeniable
pattern of discrimination was not sufficient and that the Equal Protection
Clause would be implicated only if a defendant could prove that the
prosecutor, judge, or jury consciously discriminated against the defendant
in his own particular case. 46 Relying on this precedent, a subsequent
Georgia Supreme Court decision upheld a statute allowing a judge to
impose life imprisonment for a second drug offense, even though Georgia‘s
prosecutors requested that the policy be applied against blacks sixteen times
more often than against whites; 98.4% of persons discretionarily sentenced
under the law were black. 47 The Court has also made it practically
impossible to ensure a fair jury of one’s peers; though the Court requires
prosecutors to have a non-racially discriminatory justification for using a
peremptory challenge,48 the Court has accepted clearly pretextual
justifications, such as having “the longest hair of anybody on the panel by
far,” or having a “mustache and goatee type beard,” which according to the
prosecutor in question, “look[ed] suspicious” and made the person
“appear[] not to be a good juror for that fact . . . .”49 The Court has even
closed the door to a plaintiff’s fact-finding. When the federal public
42

Id. at 60 (citing Skinner v. Ry Labor Executive’s Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 641 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
43
Id. at 131.
44
Id. at 128-30 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)).
45
Id. at 106-09 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)).
46
Id.
47
Id. at 111-12 (referring to Stephens v. State, 456 S.E.2d 560 (Ga. 1995)).
48
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
49
Id. at 120 (quoting Purkett v. Elm, 514. U.S. 765, 789 (1995)).
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defenders in Los Angeles noticed that all of their crack defendants in the
previous year were either black or Hispanic, they alleged selective
enforcement and sought to acquire information regarding the prosecutors’
charging decisions; the Court refused to grant discovery, requiring the
defenders to show solid proof of selective prosecution before being allowed
to investigate for solid proof of selective prosecution.50
Professor Alexander is not the first to compare the modern struggles of
blacks to the Jim Crow era; similar rhetoric has consistently been used to
criticize American criminal law, especially the war on drugs. In 1999,
former executive director of the ACLU Ira Glasser compared the drug laws
not only to Jim Crow but also to the internment of Japanese-Americans
during World War II. 51 Like Alexander, Glasser blamed the drug war for
discriminatory police tactics, such as racial profiling in the use of traffic
stops and Terry stop-and-frisks. 52 In 2001, the Temple Political and Civil
Rights Law Review hosted an entire symposium titled “U.S. Drug Laws:
The New Jim Crow?” 53 In a 2002 article, Graham Boyd, 54 the founder of
50

Id. at 113-15 (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996)).
Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 63 ALB. L. REV. 703, 703-04
(2000).
52
Id. at 709-11.
53
Beverly Xaviera Watkins and Mindy Thompson Fullilove noted how, despite the
recognition of the health dangers of the use of crack, particularly the spread of AIDS, the
government failed to allocate resources or provide a sufficient government response.
Beverly Xaviera Watkins & Mindy Thompson Fullilove, The Crack Epidemic and the
Failure of Epidemic Response, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 377-83 (2001).
Professor Diana Gordon examined change to drug laws, concluding that today's war on
drugs is just another example of “a rear-guard action against full equality for racial
minorities.” Diana R. Gordon, Drug Policy and the Dangerous Classes: A Historical
Overview, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 315, 320 (2001). Professor Susan Frietsche
examined policies highlighted in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), that
required hospitals to perform a drug test on mothers of newborns; if the mother tested
positive for drug use, they would be charged with distribution of drugs to a minor. Susan
Frietsche, Policing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 411
(2001). Amy Hirsch addressed how welfare reform strips poor, uneducated, and often
homeless women of necessary welfare benefits. Amy E. Hirsch, Bringing Back Shame:
Women, Welfare Reform, and Criminal Justice, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 417, 41927 (2001). Eric E. Sterling, President of The Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, discussed
the political background of the war on drugs, including politicians' exploitation of the death
of college basketball sensation Len Bias to strengthen cocaine sentences. Eric E. Sterling,
Drug Laws and Thought Crime, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 327, 329-31 (2001).
William H. Buckman and John Lamberth explained how police departments' drug courier
profiles enable racial profiling in traffic stops. William H. Buckman & John Lamberth,
Challenging Racial Profiles: Attacking Jim Crow on the Interstate, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 387, 390-94 (2001). J. Whyatt Mondesire compared felon disenfranchisement
to Jim Crow era poll taxes. J. Whyatt Mondesire, Felon Disenfranchisement: The Modern
Day Poll Tax, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 435 (2001). Marc Mauer, Assistant
Director of the Sentencing Project, highlighted the abuses in police and prosecutor
51
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the ACLU’s Drug Policy Litigation Project, voiced a number of the same
concerns addressed in Alexander’s book; he cites felon
disenfranchisement, 55 disparities in enforcement,56 prison labor, 57
revocation of government aid,58 and child custody revocation proceedings
for mothers who show signs of drug use 59 as signs that the drug war is the
New Jim Crow.
In the New Jim Crow analogy, police and prosecutors are the modern
overseers. 60 It is easy to caricature this narrative, and its exponents are
quick to acknowledge that there are important differences between slaves,
victims of legal segregation, and inmates.61 The “New Jim Crow” analysis,
however, focuses on the striking similarities.
Both slavery and
imprisonment, the argument goes, are caste defining and integral in the
production of race. 62 Both are institutions that are inextricable from white
supremacy.
III. THE CELEBRATORY TRADITION
The competing narrative about race and crime is more optimistic. The
“celebratory tradition” was originally described by Professor Randall
Kennedy as a form of racial apologetics. 63 Here, I use the term in a nonpejorative sense. It is a way of identifying the concept that racial justice has
been advanced in the last millennium and that the law has played an
discretion. Marc Mauer, Race, Drugs Laws, & Criminal Justice, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS.
L. REV. 321, 321-23 (2001). Kurt Schmoke, former Mayor of Baltimore and current Dean of
Howard Law School, discussed his strategy for ending the drug war and the crime problem
at the same time: shifting publicly allocated funds from criminal justice to public health.
Kurt Schmoke, Forging a New Consensus in the War on Drugs: Is It Possible?, 10 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 351, 356 (2001).
54
Graham Boyd, Collateral Damage in the War on Drugs, 47 VILL. L. REV. 839 (2002).
55
Id. at 843-45.
56
Id. at 845-46.
57
Id. at 848.
58
Id. at 848-49.
59
Id. at 847-48.
60
KRS-ONE, Sound of da Police, on RETURN OF THE BOOM BAP (Jive Records 1993)
(“The overseer rode around the plantation; / the [police] officer is off patrolling all the
nation. / The overseer could stop you what you’re doing; / the officer will pull you over just
when he’s pursuing. / The overseer had the right to get ill, / and if you fought back, the
overseer had the right to kill; /the officer has the right to arrest, / and if you fight back they
put a hole in your chest.”); IMMORTAL TECHNIQUE, You Never Know, on REVOLUTIONARY
VOL. 2 (Viper Records 2003) (“[I] [e]nded up locked up like an animal for a year, / where
the C.O.'s [correction officers] talk to you like they were the overseer.”).
61
See ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 195-208.
62
Id. at 182-95.
63
Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of
Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1629 (1986).
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important role in this advancement. Professor Kennedy was critical of
some constitutional scholars who he believed justified or ignored the
Supreme Court’s failures in race cases.64 This inclination, Kennedy claims,
arises from the pressure on legal scholars to provide “nationalistic selfcongratulation” in order to bestow upon the Court the appearance of
legitimacy. 65 In critiquing the celebratory tradition, Kennedy targeted the
constitutional scholarship of Professor Benno Schmidt, particularly his
work addressing the Court’s jurisprudence during the Progressive era. 66
Schmidt claimed, for example, that the Supreme Court’s peonage
decisions, which invalidated statutes forcing persons who breached
employment contracts to become indentured servants,67 effectively
dismantled southern peonage and became “the most lasting of the White
Court’s contributions to justice for black people, and among its greatest
achievements.” 68 Kennedy accused Schmidt of a gross exaggeration; the
Court’s declarations plainly failed to end peonage, as many state officials
defied the decisions and continued to apply the criminal law to acquire
forced labor. 69 Therefore, Kennedy argues, the White Court, which
Schmidt claims was distinctly more progressive than other Courts and other
branches of government at the time, “did not challenge the prevailing
ideology in the Age of Segregation, but fit quite readily within it”; the
Court continually upheld segregation, and the few progressive decisions
issued by the Court were quickly and easily evaded through legislative
subterfuge. 70

64

Id. at 1622-27.
Id. at 1659.
66
Id. at 1628. Kennedy’s critique highlights a number of Schmidt’s writings. See id. at
1268 n.26 (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., THE JUDICIARY AND
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT: 1910-1921 (9 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1984)); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., A Postscript for
Charles Black: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era, 95 YALE L.J. 1681
(1986); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The Lost
Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (1983); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.,
Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 1: The
Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1982); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and
Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 646 (1982); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The
Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 3: Black Disfranchisement from the
KKK to the Grandfather Clause, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 835 (1982)).
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Ironically, given his critique of Schmidt, Kennedy himself is the
leading practitioner of the celebratory tradition in criminal law scholarship.
His book, Race, Crime, and the Law, revels in the progress that he believes
the United States has made on race and crime issues. 71 In “(Color) Blind
Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law,” a critique of Kennedy’s
book, I noted that the book minimizes the law’s failures and exaggerates its
achievements. 72 Kennedy does not believe that racism remains a significant
concern in American criminal justice.
A celebrant like Kennedy, revisiting the list of problems that I would
have focused on in 1910, would note that many of those problems have, to a
significant degree, been solved. Lynching is no longer a significant
concern. 73 Formal legal impediments, like the exclusion of African
Americans from juries, have been removed. 74 Thanks to the Supreme
Court, accused people have many more rights, importantly including the
right to a lawyer. 75 The Court has also declared unconstitutional some
laws, like some anti-loitering statutes, that allowed police to abuse their
discretion. 76 And in addition to being a law professor, I am a former
prosecutor. 77 There are many minority actors in the criminal justice system,
including police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, jurors, judges, and
significantly, lawmakers. 78
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Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1270 (1998) (book review).
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(1994).
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Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (declaring unconstitutional a prosecutor’s use
of race-based peremptory challenges).
75
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (declaring that the Sixth Amendment
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City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999) (invalidating Chicago’s gang
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162 (1972) (invalidating Florida’s loitering law “because it encourages arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions”); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965)
(reversing defendant's conviction under a statute, literally interpreted by the trial judge, that
prohibited “stand[ing] or loiter[ing] upon any street or sidewalk . . . after having been
requested by any police officer to move on”).
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How does the celebratory tradition deal with the higher rate of
incarceration of African Americans and with other racial disparities in
criminal justice? Here, in an odd way, it remains celebratory.
The celebratory tradition identifies the principle race and crime
problem as under-enforcement. 79 The victims who merited the attention of
criminal justice in the bad old days were almost exclusively white. Police
and prosecutors were largely unconcerned about black-on-black or whiteon-black crime. 80 Thus, the fact that there are so many black people in
prison is, strangely enough, good news; all this law enforcement focus on
the African-American community is reparation for the days when crimes
against blacks went unanswered. Randall Kennedy argues that “the
principal injury suffered by African-Americans in relation to criminal
matters is not overenforcement but underenforcement of the law.”81
Law enforcement, in this story, is a public good. For a group to
complain about having too much of it would be like complaining it had too
many schools or too many parks.
This narrative is also easy to caricature. In the academy, I’ve explored
it in two contexts—first, in the aforementioned review of Randall
Kennedy’s Race, Crime, and the Law. 82 More recently, in promoting my
own book, Let’s Get Free, 83 I’ve had a series of debates with elected
prosecutors across the country. 84 We have discussed whether the work that
prosecutors do is consistent with social and racial justice. The prosecutors
I’ve debated, many of whom are African-American, all claimed that their
work is in the best interest of black people, even when that work includes
locking up many blacks. These prosecutors have identified a different main
race problem than mass incarceration. They, like Kennedy, believe that the
principle problem remains the under-protection of law and, specifically. the
disproportionate number of victims of violent crime, especially homicide,
who are African-American. 85
IV. SYMBOLIC VERSUS MATERIAL PROGRESS
My purpose here is to set out these competing narratives rather than to
choose between them. We should note, however, that they seem impossible
79

See KENNEDY, supra note 71, at 19.
Id. at 60-75.
81
Id. at 19.
82
Butler, supra note 72.
83
BUTLER, supra note 77.
84
See, e.g., Butler and Barkow Discuss the Role of Prosecutors in Social and Racial
Justice, NYU LAW (Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/forum_paul_butler
(discussion with Anthony Barkow, who was a federal prosecutor for twelve years).
85
KENNEDY, supra note 79, at 19.
80

2010]

ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF RACE AND CRIME

1055

to reconcile. They cannot both be true. If the “New Jim Crow” theorists
are correct, and the mass incarceration of blacks is simply the latest
manifestation of racial subordination, conditions are worse than (or at least
equally as bad as) they have ever been. The depressing statistics about the
number of African Americans who are locked up and other extreme racial
disparities seem to bear this out.
On the other hand, most people probably would say that an African
American has a better chance of receiving a fair trial in 2010 than he or she
would have had in 1910. It seems undeniable that the racial climate has
improved over the last one hundred years.
Can racial justice in criminal law be better and worse at the same time?
In her widely cited article, “Race, Reform, and Retrenchment,” Professor
Kimberlé Crenshaw provides a useful and nuanced way of thinking about
two kinds of racial progress: symbolic and material.86 Though Crenshaw
wrote about constitutional law rather than criminal law, her analysis
provides a helpful template for assessing the evolution of race, crime, and
the law.
Crenshaw argues that the Supreme Court’s civil rights cases benefit
African Americans but, at the same, time make further material gains more
difficult to obtain. She explains that during the Jim Crow era, blacks were
faced with two types of oppression: “symbolic subordination” and “material
subordination.” 87 Symbolic subordination includes the states’ respective
efforts to reinforce a racist ideology of black inferiority by formally
refusing to provide social and political equality to blacks. 88 Material
subordination is the actual economic subordination created by
discriminatory policies and by the hegemonic racial hierarchy supported by
the status quo. 89 Crenshaw argues that the Supreme Court has been highly
effective in ending symbolic subordination, but has had only limited
success in ending material subordination.90
With regard to race and crime, symbolic victories have been few and
far between. This is not because the Supreme Court approves of race-based
criminal laws but rather because most criminal statutes have been facially
race-neutral for generations. Racial disparities have not been caused by
discriminatory statutes; instead, such results have been achieved through
the racialized exercise of discretion, including selective enforcement by

86
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
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Id. at 1378-79.
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police departments, selective prosecution, and selective sentencing by
judges.
For example, the men convicted in Moore v. Dempsey,91 Powell v.
Alabama, 92 and Brown v. Mississippi 93—outrageous examples of Jim Crow
justice—were all charged under racially neutral criminal laws. Likewise,
the anti-loitering laws, which were abusively applied to African Americans
as described in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, were facially raceneutral. 94
As I noted earlier, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to disturb this
broad discretion, even when it is demonstrated to have racially skewed
results. Black criminal defendants do obtain some of the normative benefits
cited by Crenshaw. Minorities gained when the Court overturned those
criminal laws that were facially discriminatory, such as the laws
criminalizing anti-miscegenation invalidated in McLaughlin v. Florida 95
and Loving v. Virginia. 96 Moreover, African-American defendants have
benefited from the stigma against racism that the Supreme Court’s civil
rights cases have helped to create.
Yet material progress—the reduction, say, of racial disparities—has
not been the result. In a way, the success of the civil rights litigation in the
Supreme Court may be partly to blame. Crenshaw notes that formal
neutrality has hindered the civil rights movement’s ability to make further
advances. 97 The abolition of most facially discriminatory policies gives
credence to the theory (more aspirational than actualized) that America is
essentially a meritocratic society. 98
Because race matters less in the law, it is thought by many to matter
less in everyday life. Thus, factors other than the law are looked for to
explain sub-standard black achievement—factors like culture or even
genetics. This narrative harms African-American suspects because it
diminishes the significance of race and racism. Pointing to facially
91
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discriminatory policies was an effective way for blacks to prove that the
system was inherently oppressive; now that the “Whites Only” signs have
been taken down, it is more difficult for African Americans to explain their
experience, therefore making claims of racial subordination less credible to
people who accept these dominant narratives.
V. ACKNOWLEDGING THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE
In this Symposium, Professor Ronald Allen spoke about the political
trend, during the 1970s, of running against the Court. 99 Now, the Court,
rather than the politics, has changed. We have witnessed the decline of the
optimism of the Great Society, and its criminal justice correlate, the
rehabilitative ideal.
Thus, for the problem of mass incarceration, relief from the Supreme
Court will come unexpectedly, like the results in Booker 100 and Apprendi, 101
rather than as the product of public interest litigation designed to bring the
Court around. Groups like the NAACP and ACLU came late to
recognizing mass incarceration as a race problem and a human rights
problem, and thus missed the days of a more receptive Supreme Court. I
consult on litigation strategy with some civil rights organizations, and their
basic strategy is not to bring litigation, especially in federal court. No one,
for example, thinks this is a good time to ask the Court to declare racial
profiling unconstitutional. Even if the composition of the Court becomes
more liberal, the weight of the precedent of the Burger, Rehnquist, and
Roberts Courts is so daunting that it is difficult to imagine a welcoming
climate in the foreseeable future. One exception might be the death
penalty, where the Court is arguably more receptive to concerns about
fairness. 102
99
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Charles Ogletree, among other scholars, has observed that the Warren
Court, in its famed criminal procedure cases, was making advances in racial
justice as much as criminal procedure.103 Many of the litigants in these
cases, including Mr. Miranda 104 and Mr. Terry, 105 were African-American
or Latino. Significantly, however, the Court rarely discussed race in its
criminal procedure opinions. Its racial justice work was covert and
formally color-blind. Now even these “down low” kinds of interventions
seem absent from the Court’s criminal jurisprudence.
The central race and crime problem in the next one hundred years will
be the efficacy of dealing with race and crime problems through color-blind
law and policy. In the post-racial era, is it even possible to fix problems
that are inextricably linked to racial subordination? The increase in racial
disparities in incarceration can be attributed mainly to selective
enforcement of the drug laws. Again, this enforcement is “discriminatory”
in the sense that there is no evidence that African Americans
disproportionately commit drug offenses. 106 The Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence, which requires a discriminatory intent, and its criminal
procedure jurisprudence, which reifies law enforcement discretion, make
this race and crime problem exceedingly difficult to address through civil
rights litigation.
There are, in addition, some crimes that blacks do commit
disproportionately. 107 For these crimes, the issue of whether race should be
considered in assessing responsibility and punishment remains fraught.
Blacks do not commit crimes because they are black.
Their
overrepresentation among some classes of offenders is attributable to social
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and environmental conditions such as poverty, 108 miserable schools, 109
broken families, 110 lack of access to health care,111 and even lead
poisoning. 112 All of these factors are in turn linked to racial subordination.
If the law does not recognize this fundamental truth, if its remedies are all
color-blind, then the symptoms are treated, but the disease remains. For a
painful disease, a patient might be satisfied with treatment of symptoms;
she might feel better, even if she has not been cured. Maybe this
“improvement” is what the celebratory narrative celebrates.
Yet the disease remains. It metastasizes. This is the racial
subordination that the “New Jim Crow” storytellers focus on. The disease
cannot be cured unless it is diagnosed and treated. This would mean raceconscious remedies in criminal justice. We have such remedies in other
areas of the law, for example employment and education, because we
understand that color-blind solutions will perpetuate the status quo. Their
legal status, however, is relentlessly contested, and they are politically
unpopular. They do not seem to be the wave of the future. President
Obama, criticized about the high rate of African-American unemployment,
said, “I can’t pass laws that say ‘I’m just helping black folks.’” 113 He
asserted that his overall fixes to the economy would benefit all, including
African Americans. 114 The “rising tide will lift all boats” remedy also
seems to be the prevailing view on race and crime: improved access to
health care, more jobs, improved education, elimination of “mandatory
minimum sentences,” and other means of restoring discretion to judges—all
these will make things better for people of color in the criminal justice
system. If the “New Jim Crow” school is correct, however, race will
continue to confound criminal justice for the next one hundred years, or
however long it takes to achieve explicit racial justice interventions in
criminal justice.
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On the bicentennial of the United States Constitution, Justice
Thurgood Marshall reflected on the legal progress that the civil rights
movement helped to achieve. Justice Marshall explained that, looking
back, he saw victories, but looking forward, he saw more challenges:
What is striking is the role legal principles have played throughout America’s history
in determining the condition of Negroes. They were enslaved by law, emancipated by
law, disenfranchised and segregated by law; and, finally, they have begun to win
equality by law. . . . Thus, in this bicentennial year, we may not all participate in the
festivities with flag-waving fervor. Some may more quietly commemorate the
suffering, struggle, and sacrifice that has triumphed over much of what was wrong
with the original document, and observe the anniversary with hopes not realized and
promises not fulfilled.” 115

The experience of the last one hundred years teaches us that racial
progress in criminal justice is not inevitable, but it is possible, at least in
some limited sense. Whether racial justice can be accomplished in a legal
and political climate that rebuffs race discourse may still be an open
question at the Journal’s bicentennial in 2110. In the meantime, in 2010,
nearly one million African Americans languish in prison, and millions more
under some other form of criminal supervision.
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